Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1969

Myrl Wells v. Blue Shield of Utah : Brief of Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Albert R. Bowen; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Wells v. Utah, No. 11871 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4953

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE

SUPREME COUIT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MYRL WELLS,

'Pl,o,inRff

BLUE SHIELD OF UTAH,
DefnulJl.nt au

Appealed from the District Court of B9

Stat.e of Utala
THE HONORABLE LEWIS JOllBll.

D. GARY CHRISTIAN
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
620 Boston Buiktinc
Salt Lake City, Utah 8'111
Attorne21S /or Pftlitlllljff

J
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
,_.F THE NATURE OF THE CASE______ 1

,,..,

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS--------------------------------------------------

1

STATEMENT OF POINTS ------------------------·----------------·---· 6
ARGUMENT ----------------------------------·--------------------·--------------·· 6
POINT I.

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES DID NOT BY ITS TERMS
ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFF TO THE
BENEFITS SUED FOR IN HIS COMPLAINT AND THE CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND ARE
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ---·---· 6

POINT II. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS -------- 12
AUTHORITIES CITED
Anderson v. Great Eastern Casualty Co., 51 Utah 78,
168 P. 966 ---·--------------------------------------···-----·------------------- 17
Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Insurance
Company, 7 Utah 2d. 336, 325 P.2d 264 -------------------- 16
Barmeier v. Oregon Physician's Service, 243 P.2d 1053 ---· 8
Bonneville Lumber Company v. J. G. Peppard Seed
Company, 72 Utah 463, 271 P. 226 --------·--·---·--------·--- 17
Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States, 92 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060 ------------···· 17
Bryant v. Deseret News Publishing Company, 120 Utah
241, 233 P.2d 355 ----·--··------······---···-···········-··-·--·-·····-··
16

'.l

Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d. 163,
321 P.2d. 221 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 14
Fawcett v. Security Benefit Association, 99 Utah 193,
104 P.2d 214 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 14
Group Hospital Services v. Armstrong (Tex.), 240
S.W.2d 418 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
Issacson v. Wise Casualty Association, 203 N.W. 918 ________ 11
Moss v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association,
89 Utah 1, 56 P.2d 1351 -------------------------------------------- 15
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association v. Milder,
(Neb) 41 N.W. 2d 780 at p. 795 -------------------------------- 10
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company v. Idaho Stockyards Company, 12 Utah 2d. 205, 364 P.2d 826 ________ 16
Red v. Group Medical & Surgical Services (Tex) 298
S.W. 2d. 623 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
Richlands Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation
Company, 96 Utah 403, 80 P.2d 458 ---------------------------- 16
State Medical Society of Wisconsin v. Charles Manson,
Commissioner, (Wis) 12 N.W. 2d. 231 ------------------------ 12
Stout v. Washington Fire & Marine Insurance Company,
14 Utah 2d. 414, 384 P.2d 608 ------------------------------------ 13
Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co., 47 Utah 91, 151 P. 543 -------- 7
Vitagraph Inc., v. American Theatre Co., 77 Utah 71,
291 P. 303 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13

IN THE

SlJPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MYRL WELLS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 11871

BLUE SHIELD OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIFF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Action by plaintiff to recover benefits claimed under a
medical prepayment contract issued by defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment in plaintiff's favor and an order of this court directing the court below to enter judgment in favor of defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case came before the court on August 12, 1969, on
a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant and for
trial. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was
denied (TR 23). Submitted with said motion and received
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in evidence by the court was the medical prepayment contract issued by defendant (Exhibit "A," TR 24). On motion of the plaintiff, plaintiff's deposition was also received
in evidence as part of plaintiff's case (Tr 24). Portions of
this desposition were read in evidence.
Upon the denial of defendant's motion for summary
judgment plaintiff made an oral motion for judgment based
upon the pleadings and the evidence inasmuch as no further
evidence was required for determination of the case; and
defendant stipulated that said motion might be considered
immediately without notice. The court granted the motion
of the plaintiff and ordered that judgment be entered in
favor of plaintiff for $780.00 plus costs (TR 23).
Thereafter proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law were signed and entered by the court on or about August
26, 1969, (TR 56-57). Thereupon defendant filed a motion
under rules 52B, 59A and 59E to amend the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment, or in the alternative for a
new trial (R 60). Defendant's motion to amend was heard
on September 9, 1969. The court granted defendant's motion to amend the findings of fact but denied the motion to
amend the conclusions of law and judgment (TR 34, 35 and
36). An order granting defendant's motion to amend the
findings and amended findings were submitted after Judge
Jones' sudden and unexpected death and were signed by
Judge Young on September 23, 1969, (R 62, 63 and 64).
On April 16, 1968, plaintiff was injured in an accident
at his home in Corinne, Utah, while he was attempting to
repair a damaged fuel tank. He was using a jack on the
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inside of this tank, when it slipped while under pressure
and the handle 1,..- ;;ome other part of the jack struck plaintiff in the mouth (pl.'s depo. p. 3-4, TR 4-5). This accident
broke plaintiff's jaw, knocked out three teeth and broke
several other teeth, and forced his teeth into the back of his
mouth (pl.'s depo. p. 4 and 5, TR 4).
After the accident, plaintiff was taken by his wife to
the office of Dr. H.J. Griffin, where he received some emergency treatment and was then referred to Dr. White, an
oral surgeon, in Tremonton, Utah, for hospitalization and
treatment of the fractured jaw (TR 5, 6, 7). Plaintiff was
under Dr. White's care for about seven weeks until the
fracture healed (pl.'s depo. p. 7). After his discharge by
Dr. White, plaintiff returned to Dr. Griffin for the dental
repairs made necessary as a result of the accident (TR 6-7).
Dr. Griffin performed only dental services for the plaintiff
(TR 8). Plaintiff submitted to defendant the bill of Dr.
White for oral surgical services performed in the treatment
of the fracture which defendant paid (TR 7, pl.'s depo. p. 7).
When the dental bill of Dr. Griffin was submitted to the defendant, payment was denied on the ground that the contract issued by the defendant to the plaintiff expressly
excluded payment for dental services and because Dr. Griffin was not a "participating or non-participating physician"
within the terms of the prepayment medical contract held
by the plaintiff.
There is no dispute regarding the occurrence of the
accident which plaintiff sustained on April 16, 1968, nor is
there any dispute that at the time of said accident plaintiff
was a subscriber to the contract issued by defendant to
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plaintiff about 1965, upon which this suit was brought, or
that said contract was in good standing and in full force
and effect on the day of the accident (TR 9).
Plaintiff had obtained this contract from defendant
through the Farmers' Union of which he was a member
(TR 9). The contract was solicited by an agent of defendant
(TR 10). There is no evidence and plaintiff was unable to
recall the substance of any conversation between him and
defendant's agent that preceded the issuance of the con.
tract or of any representations made by said agent with
regard to the benefits offered in said contract (TR 10, pl.'s
depo. p. 18). He did testify that there were no discussions
about the exclusion of benefits from the contract which he
could recall (TR 11). Not until after the accident did plaintiff ever read the contract and discover that Article 3B
excluded certain benefits and services (TR 11-12). Plaintiff had no recollection of any representations concerning
the contract made by defendant's agent (pl.'s depo. p. 18·
19). After the contract was delivered to plaintiff, he never
read it in any detail (pl.'s depo. p. 20).
In the light of the foregoing facts, it is necessary to
consider certain pertinent provisions of the contract between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant's Exhibit "A,"
about which there is no dispute, in the very first paragraph
contains the following pertinent language:
"This contract * * * entitles the subscriber and
family dependents * * * to have, on and after the
date membership becomes effective hereunder, services
from the participating physician of their choice."
(Emphasis added)
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Article IE of tht contract defines the term "participating phy o. ci&.r.,' in th it'! language :
"Participating physician shall mean any doctor
licensed as a physician and surgeon to practice medicine
in all its branches, who by virtue of his stock membership in the Bureau has agreed to render the services
provided by this contract."
Article IIA ( 1) sets out the surgical services the member shall be entitled to receive in this language:
"The following services, except as limited in Article III hereafter, shall be available to the member * * *
when rendered by a participating physician of the
Bureau:
"A ( 1). Surgical services rendered by a participating physician in the treatment of diseases, illnesses or
injury. The term surgical services shall mean * * *
treatment of fractures and dislocations or orthopedic
casting * * *"
Throughout this contract the services to be provided
are required to be furnished by "participating physician."
In Article IV A of the contract, it is provided that under
certain circumstances the services of a "non-participating
physician" may be made available. In said Article IV A a
non-participating physician is defined as a physician and
surgeon "licensed as a physician and surgeon to practice
medicine in all its branches.*" Finally, Article IIIB of the
contract contains certain exclusions not covered by the contract. Article IIIB (7) says specifically:
"The services provided by this contract shall not
include the following:
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"(7). Physician's services for the extraction of
teeth or other dental processes."

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES DID
NOT BY ITS TERMS ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFF TO
THE BENEFITS SUED FOR IN HIS COMPLAINT AND
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
OF THE COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
COURT'S FINDINGS AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE.
POINT II
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS
NOT AMBIGUOUS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES DID
NOT BY ITS TERMS ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFF TO
THE BENEFITS SUED FOR IN HIS COMPLAINT AND
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE COURT'S
FINDINGS AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.
It is a well established principle in this State that the
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lower court's findings must be supported by the evidence.
Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co., 47 Utah 91, 151 P. 543. The
appeJlant contends that the trial court's findings are not
support€.d by the
even when the evidence is viewed
mosL favornhly for respondent.
The defendant has never disputed the existence of a
valid contract or that it was in force on April 16, 1968, so as
to entitle the plaintiff to the benefits thereby provided; nor
has the defendant ever asserted or claimed that the plaintiff did not sustain injuries in an accident which made
necessary the services of a dentist as shown by the evidence
in this record. However, defendant earnestly contends that
the fact that plaintiff sustained such injuries in an accident on that date did not entitle him to the services of a
dentist. It was for such services that the plaintiff instituted
this action. Nowhere in the record in this case did plaintiff point out that the express provisions of the contract
entitled him to the benefits of dental services; and it is
only by construction, which the plaintiff contends must be
applied to the contract, that the contention can be supported
that the contract does provide for dental benefits. It is
undisputed in the record that Dr. H. Jay Griffin, who rendered the service, for which plaintiff brought this action,
was a dentist and that the only service which he performed
for plaintiff was dental service (TR 6, 7-8) . No contention
is made that Dr. Griffin was a participating physician
within the definition of Article IE of the contract and the
court specifically found that he was not (R 23). Any other
finding by the court would have been contrary to all the
evidence in this record. Nor is there any evidence in the
record to support a contention, and none was claimed by
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plaintiff, that defendant ever represented that the contract
sued upon included dental services or that such a representation was used to induce the plaintiff to accept the contract.
As defendant has already pointed out, the very first
paragraph of the contract between the parties specifically
provides that the services to be furnished to the plaintiff
under the contract were those of a "participating physician"
as defined in Article IE as "a doctor licensed as a physician
and surgeon to practice medicine in all its branches (Defendant's Exhibit "A"). Furthermore, Article II of Exhibit "A" clearly and unequivocally states that the services
to be made available to the member holding the contract
shall be rendered by a participating physician whether
they be surgical or medical services as set out in paragraph
A of said Article. Throughout Exhibit "A" it is provided
that services to be furnished shall be those of a "participating
physician," the court so found in its findings of fact (R
62-63). The court further found that Article IIIB (7) of the
contract provided "the services provided by this contract
shall not include the following: (7) Physician services for
the extraction of teeth or other dental services" (R 55). In
the face of undisputed, plain, explicit and unambiguous
provisions of the contract, the court rendered its judgment
that plaintiff should recover for the service of Dr. Griffin, a
dentist who was not a participating physician within the
terms of this contract. By its conclusions and judgment,
the court undertook to rewrite the contract between the
parties upon the ground that it was ambiguous-the law is
clear that the court was in error in so ruling.
In Barmeier v. Oregon Physicians' Service, (Ore.) 243
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P.2d. 1053, the plaintiff sought to compel the defendant
to pay certain benefits for medical and surgical services
incurred by her
the result of injuries sustained by her in
an :111t.1)11"0bile ar:,_1dent under an agreement similar to the
one involved in this case. The agreement in Barmeier provided that defendant could not be required to pay for any
expenses which resulted from the negligence of third parties
unless the subscriber could show that recovery from such
third party would be unsuccessful. The plaintiff had sued
the third parties which caused her injuries and had compromised her claim for an amount in excess of the medical and
surgical expense which she had incurred. Plaintiff then
sued defendant to compel it to make payment for her medical and surgical expenses. The court denied recovery holding that by the terms of the contract plaintiff was not
entitled to recover. It was held that while the contract in
some particulars was ambiguous as to what plaintiff was
required to do in order to recover benefits under her contract, the contract as a whole provided that if she recovered
sufficient money to cover her medical and surgical expenses
in a suit against the third parties causing the injury, the
defendant could not be required to pay any of the benefits
under the contract. The court said:
"* * * the parties to the contract had the right to
limit the liabilities of O.P.S. and place upon its obligations any conditions that they pleased * * * the rule is
not otherwise although the conditions of limitation may
be harsh or onerous * * *. Courts cannot ignore such
conditions, for to do so would be to make a new contract
for the parties."

A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed because the
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trial court refused to enforce the limitations of the contract which were express provisions limiting the plaintiff's
right of recovery.
In Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association v.
Milder, (Neb.) 41 N.W.2d. 780 at p. 795, the court held that a
health and accident insurance company may limit its liabilities in any reasonable manner, such as requiring that for
sickness benefit to be payable the insured must be continually within doors and have regular visits by a physician
in order to recover on the policy. It further held that such a
limitation was not unreasonable and did not contravene public policy. In Group Hospital Services v. Armstrong, (Tex.)
240 S.W.2d. 418, the plaintiff sought to compel defendant
to pay certain benefits provided in a contract issued by
defendant which was a group hospital association, when one
of the conditions of the contract was that service would
only be paid for when provided in a hospital approved by
the American Medical Association. It was held in that
case that the provision of the contract limiting payment to
hospitals registered with the A.M.A. was valid; and that,
therefore, defendant could refuse payment for services
rendered to the plaintiff in a hospital not registered with
the A.M.A. The court specifically held that plaintiff got
that which he contracted for and that the court should not
extend the coverage beyond the terms of the contract.
In Red v. Group Medical & Surgical Services, (Tex.)
298 S.W.2d 623, plaintiff sued defendant, a Blue Shield
medical service association, to compel it to pay for a lipreading course which plaintiff's minor son had received to
teach him the art of lip reading after he was rendered
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totally deaf from cerebra-spinal meningitis. The defendant
had paid all the expenses for the treatment of the disease,
hut refused to pay for the lip-reading course on the ground
that it was not. •·overed by the terms of the contract as
"expenses incurred in the treatment and care of the patient." It was held that recovery was properly denied,
that the construction of the medical service contract claimed
by the plaintiff would be going beyond the intent of the
parties, and further that the contract was not ambiguous.
In Issacson v. Wise Casualty Association (Wis.) 203 N.W.
918, the plaintiff sought to recover for the services of a
chiropractor which he had received in treatment for rheumatism and pleurisy. Under the insurance contract which had
been issued to plaintiff by defendant, defendant had agreed
to pay for services rendered by a physician. The question
in that case was whether a chiropractor was a physician
within the meaning of the policy-it was held no. That
court said:

"It is clear that the parties to an insurance policy
have a right to limit or qualify the terms of the contract
in any manner not inconsistent with the conditions of
the standard form or contrary to public policy."
It was, therefore, proper for the insurance company to
require, as a condition of the payment of sick benefits,
that the insured should be attended by a "legally qualified
physician and that if the insured failed to avail himself of
such services, the company would be excused from paying
the sick benefit." The court held that a chiropractor "was
not a physician within the traditional concept of that term
and plaintiff was not entitled to recover for his services
* * * " The court further said: "* * * we think the inten-
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tion was so clear that a legally qualified physician should be
employed in order to enable the insured to recover the sick
benefit."
Also in State Medical Society of Wisconsin v. Charles
Manson, Commissioner, (Wis.) 12 N.W.2d. 231, the court
held that a podiatrist did not come within the definition of a
"medical or osteopathic physician licensed to practice in
Wisconsin."
In view of the uncontroverted fact that the contract in
question in this case expressly provides that the only service
to be provided to the subscriber is that of a participating
physician, which is defined expressly to mean a doctor licensed as a physician and surgeon to practice medicine in all
its branches, proper construction of the contract requires a
holding that the service of a dentist is not covered and
cannot be recovered by plaintiff as a benefit under the plain
and unambiguous terms of the contract, even though made
necessary by reason of an accident.
It is, therefore, clear that the trial court by ruling
that this contract was intended to include the services of
Dr. Griffin, a dentist, was erroneous, and was contrary to
the findings of fact and the undisputed evidence in the

record.
POINT II
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS
NOT AMBIGUOUS.
Defendant concedes that the rule applicable in this
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State, not only ih cases involving insurance contracts but
31,, , >1 .:'.G' tr!i ci s generally, is that ambiguities are to be
cnnstrued against the p::i.rty who wrote the contract. However, this rule is only applicable where the ambiguity creates
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning and intent of the
parties. This rule is exemplified in the case of Stout v.
Wash:ngton Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 14 Utah
2d. 414, 384 P.2d. 608. However, a corollary of this rule
is that in interpreting a contract, the entire instrument
must be considered, and even though one provision may
contain an ambiguity, if other provisions of the entire instrument clearly resolve the ambiguity, then the rule of
construction against the author of the instrument is not
applicable. In Vitagraph Inc. v. American Theater Co., 77
Utah, 71, 291 P. 303, the court said:
"These provisions of the assignment contract lend
some support to appellant's contention. In construing
a contract, however, 'the interpretation must be upon
the entire instrument and not merely on disjointed or
particular parts of it. The whole context is to be considered in ascertaining the intention of the parties,
even though the immediate object of inquiry is the
meaning of an isolated clause. Every word in the
agreement must be taken to have been used for a purpose, and no word should be rejected as mere surplusage
if the court can discover any reasonable purpose thereof
which can be gathered from the whole instrument.
The contract must be viewed from beginning to end and
all of its terms must pass in review; for one clause
may modify, limit, illuminate the other. Taking its
words in their ordinary and usual meaning, no substantive clause must be allowed to perish by construction, unless insurmountable obstacles stand in the way
of any other course. Seeming contradictions must be
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harmonized if that course· is reasonably possible. Each
of its provisions must be considered in connection with
the others, and, if possible, effect must be given to ali.
A construction which entirely neutralizes one provision
should not be· adopted if the contract is susceptible of
another which gives effect to all of its provisions."
In Fawcett v. Security Benefit Association, 99 Utah,
193, 104 P.2d. 214, the court construed the language of an
insurance contract and said with respect to alleged ambiguj.
ties the following :
"Since such provision of the certificate is not so
clear as to be susceptible of but one construction, we
must determine which of the permissible interpreta..
tions thereof is consistent with the other provisions of
the entire agreement. Even though a particular pro·
vision of a contract of insurance be susceptible of more
than one meaning, the construction of such provision
more favorable to the assured will not be adopted if
other provisions of the entire contract clearly resolve
the ambiguity in favor of the contrary construction."
Furthermore, the ambiguity, if there is one, must be
determined from the instrument itself and resort may not
be had for interpretation or explanation from outside
sources. Ephraim Theater Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d.
163, 321 P.2d 221:
"In considering the controversy here it is well to
keep in mind the fundamental concepts in regard to
contracts: that their purpose is to reduce to writing
the conditions upon which the minds of the parties have
met and to fix their rights and duties in respect thereto.
The intent so expressed is to be found, if possible,
within the four corners of the instrument itself in
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acco1· lance with the ordinary accepted meaning of the
word:: :.med. Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty
in the language so that the meaning is confused, or is
susceptible of more than one meaning, there is no
justification for interpretation or explanation from
extraneous sources. It would defeat the very purpose
of formal contracts to permit a party to invoke the use
of words or conduct inconsistent with its terms to prove
that the parties did not mean what they said, or to use
such inconsistent words or conduct to demonstrate
uncertainty or ambiguity where none would otherwise
exist. Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor
the court has any right to ignore or modify conditions
which are clearly expressed merely because it may
subject one of the parties to hardship, but they must be
enforced 'in accordance with the intention as * * *
manifested by the language used by the parties to the
contract!"
Moreover, where the language used is plain, unequivocal and unambiguous, the rule for resolving ambiguities
against the author of the instrument is not applicable. In
Moss v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 89
Utah, 1, 56 P. 2d 1351, this court stated:
"The language is plain, unequivocal and unambiguous. The rule contended for by appellant for a
construction of an ambiguous provision most strongly
against the insurer and in favor of the insured has no
application here. In Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co.,
284 U.S. 489, 52 S. Ct. 230, 231, 76 L. Ed. 416, Mr.
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the court, said: 'It is
true that where the terms of a policy are of doubtful
meaning, that construction most favorable to the insured will be adopted. * * * This canon of construction
is both reasonable and just, since the words of the policy
are chosen by the insurance company; but it furnishes

16
no warrant for avoiding hard consequences by import
ing into a contract an ambiguity which otherwise would
not exist, or, under the guise of construction, by fore.
ing from plain words unusual and unnatural mean.
ings."
Again in Bryant v. Deseret News Publishing Company,
120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355, the same rule was announced in
this language :
"Plaintiff also invokes the rule of interpretation
that doubtful, ambiguous terms in a contract should be
interpreted against the party who has chosen the
terms * * * We agree that these rules of construction
should be considered in determining what is a rea.
sonable and fair interpretation of the intention of the
parties : However, if the language is clear and is not
susceptible of more than one interpretation, the ordi·
nary plain meaning of the words must be used."
See also Oregon Short Line Railroad Company v. Idalw
Stockyards Company, 12 Utah 2d 205, 364 P.2d 826, and
Richlands Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation Company,
96 Utah 403, 80 P.2d 458.
In other words, there must be a real ambiguity, no
forced or strained construction may be employed in order to
get a different meaning in accordance with the interest of
one of the parties. This rule was announced by this court
in Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Insurance Company, 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264, wherein this court said:
1

"In case of uncertainty or ambiguity, the language
of the policy should be construed most strongly against
the company because it drew and issued it, but that rule
has no application unless there is some genuine am·
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or uncertainty in the language upon which
That
is not satisfied because a party may get
a different meaning by placing a forced or strained
comitruction upon it in accordance with his interest.
The test to be applied is : Would the meaning be plain
to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding,
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance
with the usual and natural meaning of words, and in
the light of existing circumstances, including the purpose of the policy. If so, the special rule of construction is obviously unnecessary."
bigu]i v.

hle minds may differ as to the meaning.

See also EJJhrain Theater Company v. Hawk, supra. In
construing the contract, the language must be given its
plain, ordinary and obvious meaning. Bonneville Lumber
Company v. J. G. Peppard Seed Company, 72 Utah 463,
271 P. 226:
"It is a cardinal rule of construction, and the first
to be applied whenever construction becomes necessary,
that, unless technical terms are used, the language
must be given its plain, ordinary and obvious meaning."

Bryant v. Deseret News Publishing Company, supra.
It is also the rule recognized in Utah that the fundamental and true purpose of construing the language of a
contract is to arrive at the true intention of the parties.
Anderson v. Great Eastern Casualty Co., 51 Utah 78, 168 P.
966. In Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of
the United States, 92 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060, it was stated
by this court that:
"The contract of insurance should be construed
so as to carry out the intention of both parties, not
merely the intention of one party."
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Tested by the foregoing rules, it must be clear that
plaintiff was not entitled to require defendant, under his
contract, to pay for the services of Dr. H. Jay Griffin. The
language of the contract itself makes this apparent. From
this language it is clear that there is no need to resort to
any evidence outside the four corners of the contract in
order to determine its meaning. As we have already pointed
out, the· first paragraph of this Exhibit "A" defines the
kind of medical service which the defendant is required to
provide and which the plaintiff shall be entitled to receive.
That language is as follows :
"This contract * * * entitles the subscriber and
family dependents* * *to have* * * services from the
participating physician of their choice."
We have already pointed out that Article IE states that a
participating physician is a doctor licensed as a physician
and surgeon to practice medicine in all its branches. Even
in those instances where the contract provides that a member
may be entitled to the services of a non-participating physi·
cian who is a physician not holding stock membership in the
defendant association or who has not agreed to render the
services provided by the contract, such service must be
rendered by a physician and surgeon licensed to practice
medicine in all its branches (Article IVA of Exhibit "A").
Thus from the language of the contract itself, the intention
of the parties can be clearly ascertained that the service to
be provided shall not include the service of a dentist.
In order to make doubly certain that the services of a
dentist were not intended to be covered under this contract,
Article IIIB (7) specifically excludes "physician's service
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for extraction of teeth or other dental processes." The trial
court speciL' ally found that Dr. Griffin, who performed
Hv
vicc>s ft 1 ..vhich this action was brought, was a dental
surgeon and was Pot a physician and surgeon licensed to
practice medicine in all its branches at and during the time
said services were performed for and on behalf of the plaintiff ( R. 63) . Under such a finding it is respectfully submitted that to require defendant to pay for Dr. Griffin's
services on plaintiff's behalf not only flies in the face of the
plain, express and unambiguous language of the contract,
but furthermore enlarges and rewrites the contract to include benefits not intended or contracted for by the parties.
Plaintiff and the trial court attempted to seize upon
isolated provision of the contract defining surgical
benefits to which plaintiff was entitled. Plaintiff called the
trial court's attention to the provision of Article IIA (1) part
of which is set out in the court's findings (R 55). The full
text of this provision, paraphrased to omit unnecessary
verbage, is as follows :
"* * *services except as limited in Article III hereafter shall be available to the member * * * when
rendered by a participating physician of the Bureau."
(Emphasis added)
"A ( 1). * * * surgical services rendered by a participating physician in the· treatment of diseases, illnesses or injury." (Emphasis added)
Even though it is apparent that the services of Dr.
Griffin to the plaintiff were rendered in the treatment of an
injury, such service was not the treatment of a fracture,
dislocation or orthopedic casting. The court did not so find,
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but merely recited the provision of the contract as including
treatment of such conditions (R 55). The uncontradicted
evidence is that plaintiff's fractured jaw was treated by
Dr. White, an oral surgeon (TR 5, 6 and 7). The plaint:fi
remained under Dr. White's care for seven weeks or untli
the fracture was healed (pl.'s depo. p. 7). It was only after
Dr. White had completed his work in the treatment of the
fracture that Dr. Griffin performed the dental work made
necessary by the accident. (TR 6-7). It was conceded by
plaintiff that only dental services were performed by Dr.
Griffin (TR 8).
The trial court seemed to labor under the misconcep.
tion that because the dental services became necessary by
reason of an accident and not because of the natural procesi
of decay that plaintiff should recover for such dental
services. As Appellant construes the trial court's reason·
ing, recovery for the plaintiff was ordered because all oi
plaintiff's injuries were incurred at the same time, in the
same accident and because plaintiff was entitled to
for treatment of the jaw fracture, he should likewise be able
to require defendant to pay for the dental work; and further
that this was so notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Griffin's
services were confined to dental work and that he wa.1
neither a participating nor even a non-participating physi·
cian within the plain meaning and language of the contract:
and notwithstanding that the contract by express ter'lll!
excluded physician services for extraction of teeth or other
dental processes. The court seemed to reason that becaUSI
the plaintiff sustained injuries, it was the intention of the
parties that if treatment thereof could only be performed
by a dentist then such treatment should be paid for as a
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benefit under the contract. The contention of plaintiff that
the language of Article IIA ( 1) was rendered ambiguous by
reaRon of lang-uage of Article IIIB (7) is totally untenable.
ln c.mier th.at there can be no doubt as to the kind of

service rendered by Dr. Griffin, the plaintiff was asked on
his deposition what was done by Dr. Griffin, the plaintiff
testified as follows :
Q. The dental work has all been taken care of by Dr.

Griffin, is that right?

A. Yes.
Q. And did that work consist of replacing the teeth

that were knocked out?

A. Yes.
Q. In the accident?

A. Yes.
Q. And repairing teeth that were damaged in the

accident?

A. Yes.
Q. And also bridging?

A. Yes.
Q. And it was for the repair of your teeth?

A. Yes. (TR 14)

Also:
Q. So that Dr. White knew that Dr. Griffin was your

dentist?

A. Yes.
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Q. So when he said "I am through with my work, i

will release you to go back now to have the dent.a
work done" he knew that you would be going bacl
to Dr. Griffin to have that work done?

A. Yes.

(TR 15)

Dr. Griffin's statement was admitted in evidence as Exhibil
"2" to plaintiff's deposition (TR 7). Plaintiff was
about the contents of this statement as follows :
Q. It says over here as I read it, and you can correct me
if necessary, a seven-tooth bridge, is that what you

understand ?

A. Yes.
Q. And two inlay abutments?

A. Yes.
Q. And two incisal inlays?

A. Yes.
Q. And there is something about ceramic, I suppose

that is the material out of which the bridge
made?

wai

A. Yes.
Q. And would this include the replacement of thi

teeth that you lost in the accident?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you lose seven teeth?

A. No.
Q. How many?

A. Well, they had to put a bridge in there and the!
had to grind off a bunch of my teeth.
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Q. They had to anchor the bridge didn't they?

A. Yes.

<J. ALd actually you lost three teeth?
A. Yes.
Q. And they have been replaced?

A.

(witness nodded his head)

Q. And you are wearing the partial denture that Dr.

Griffin made for you following the accident.

A. Uhuh!
The fact that plaintiff was not aware that dental
services were excluded from the contract is immaterial. We
have already cited authorities holding that a party has a
right to limit the coverage of a contract of this type, and
that such a contract, as so limited, defines the services
which are to be provided and by whom they are to be provided: Barmeier v. Oregon Physician Services, supra, Red v.
Group Medical & Surgical Services, supra, Isaacson v. Wisconsin Casualty Association, supra, and Group Hospital
Services v. Armstrong, supra.
The contract in this case was limited by its language
to injuries treated by a participating surgeon and was not
an agreement to pay for treatment of injuries without regard to who furnished or provided such treatment. If the
construction which plaintiff would place upon this contract
is correct, then the plaintiff could have claimed benefits for
treatment of injuries by any practitioner of the healing arts,
including chiropractor, naturopath, chiropodist, occurring in
an accident. It is submitted that such construction is untenable.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court below is not supported
either by the findings of the court or the evidence in tht
record for two reasons :
1. Because this contract between parties expressly
excluded dental services from the benefits covered by the
contract ; and
2. Because the services for which recovery is sought
were not furnished by a doctor licensed as a physician and
surgeon to practice medicine in all its branches, which limita.
tions the defendant was entitled to place upon the contract
issued to the plaintiff.
Furthermore, the contract between the parties is not
ambiguous. Its plain meaning and intent can be ascer·
tained from the four corners of the instrument. Even if
it could be successfully contended that this contract contains an ambiguity, which the defendant has expressly de·
nied, there is no way in which the ambiguity claimed by
plaintiff can be construed to include the services of a dentist or that a dentist is a participating physician within
the terms of the contract. On the other hand, the contract
on its face and the evidence in the record shows as a matter
of law that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought
and, therefore, the judgment should be reversed and judg·
men should be ordered in favor of the defendant.
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